Incrementalism in the Conduct of Defense Policy in Brazil

Abstract

This article examines the conduct of defense policies directed at the national defense industry (IND) and arms exports since the 2008 National Defense Strategy (END). It argues that the Ministry of Defense’s (MD) decisions follow an incremental logic, maintaining the status quo of these policies and limiting the sector's international scale. Grounded in Charles Lindblom’s incrementalism and Keith Krause’s defense economics, the study adopts a case study methodology to analyze the effects of political decisions on budget executions, strategic projects, and arms exports. The article concludes that the persistence of this incremental logic inhibits the defense transformation intended by the END. Finally, it recommends restructuring the MD’s decision-making process to achieve effective coordination of the entire system.

Introduction

The record exports of Brazil’s defense industry drew attention in the national news media at the end of 2025.¹ At first glance, the attention appears positive; after all, policy incentives for the productive sector not only worked but also enabled it to achieve scale in the external market. A closer look, however, reveals discontinuities, inconsistencies, and gaps in policies directed at this industry. To date, it has only partially met the demands of strategic defense projects and exports primarily small arms and light weapons (SALW) (revolvers, pistols, rifles, etc.). A paradox thus emerges: the aim is to reorganize the national defense industry (NDI) to produce major conventional weapons and meet the needs of the armed forces (for example, the VBTP-MR Guarani and the F-39 Gripen), yet economies of scale are achieved with SALW, a segment in which the country is competitive and ranks among the world’s largest exporters. In the future, this paradox may jeopardize the NDI and even national defense.

The research question investigated in this article is why the national defense industry, specifically the major conventional weapons segment, has not achieved scale in the external market since 2008. A conventional investigation of this problem would draw on the defense economics literature, emphasizing budgetary, fiscal, productive, technological, and other aspects. Going further, it is also possible to investigate the problem through theoretical models of public policy, in which the decision-making process matters for outcomes. Drawing on contributions from both fields, it is argued that the incremental logic of decision-making within the Ministry of Defense (MD) maintains the status quo of policies designed to foster the NDI and prevents it from achieving scale externally.

This research adopts Keith Krause’s theoretical contributions to defense economics and Charles Lindblom’s incremental decision-making model (muddling through).² First, according to Krause (1995), the pursuit of economies of scale is a strategic imperative for third-tier arms producers, a category that includes Brazil, because domestic demand is limited, the global market is concentrated, external dependence and technological barriers are permanent risks, and the promotion of industrial development represents an opportunity. Second, Lindblom’s model, known as the method of successive limited comparisons, assumes that decisions are made gradually, without drastic reforms or exhaustive analyses, given the complexity of real-world problems, human limitations (particularly the absence of complete information), and the unavoidable conflict among values.

Methodologically, an exploratory case study is proposed of the decision-making process within the MD concerning policies directed at the national defense industry and their implications for budget execution, the strategic projects of the Brazilian armed forces, and Brazilian arms exports between 2008 and 2025. The chosen timeframe is justified because the first version of the National Defense Strategy (END), promulgated in December 2008, became the major milestone in the reorganization of the national defense industry—then defined as one of the document’s structuring axes—and in a process of national defense transformation.

The main conclusion of this article is that the transformation of national defense, specifically the national defense industry and arms exports, requires overcoming the incremental logic of the decision-making process. In a fragmented decision-making structure, there is no synergy among defense, conditioning, and sectoral policies to strengthen the NDI and improve Brazil’s international position in the arms market. Therefore, a structural transformation is recommended that would enable the MD to exercise effective and centralized coordination over the entire national defense decision-making process. Policies designed to foster the NDI and promote arms exports must be formulated, reviewed, and updated in an integrated and systemic manner, rather than simply on an ad hoc basis. Political and strategic directives must be fulfilled instead of meeting the operational and immediate needs, particularly those of the armed forces=

Finally, this article is structured into four sections, in addition to this introduction. The first section presents an analysis of the decision-making process of defense policies in Brazil, particularly those relating to the defense industry, based on Lindblom’s incremental model (2010a; 2010b). The second section assesses the evolution of the Ministry of Defense’s budget execution and strategic defense projects, also employing the incremental model. The third section, drawing on Krause’s (1995) contributions to defense economics, demonstrates the implications of policies designed to foster the defense industry and arms exports for promoting the sector and the country’s integration into the global arms trade. Lastly, the fourth section contains recommendations for restructuring the national defense decision-making process, with the purpose of overcoming incremental logic and providing greater coordination and centralization of decision-making within the MD.

Section 1: Causal

The Incremental Logic of National Defense Decision-Making in Brazil

Defense policy is a public policy like any other area (culture, education, health, security, etc.), but with sui generis features. First, it is the only policy whose ultimate purpose is precisely what one seeks to avoid: war. It must provide for maximum efficiency in the use of force, but as an instrument of deterrence—curiously, it is a matter of preparing for war in order not to wage war. Moreover, unlike other policies that provide tangible public goods (the construction of a hospital or a school, for example), such goods are not always perceived in the acquisition of a submarine, tank, or fighter aircraft, particularly in countries that are peaceful in their external relations and/or have other unmet needs. Finally, there is also military autonomy and inter-service corporatism in the decision-making process, reducing the participation of other actors, including the Ministry of Defense itself. It is therefore unsurprising that Brazilian society has difficulty understanding and supporting policies related to national defense.

Since this is a complex problem, Lindblom’s incremental model is appropriate for understanding the national defense decision-making process and its outcomes, particularly insofar as they affect the national defense industry and arms exports. In the author’s original proposal in the late 1950s, the model was structured around five postulates. The first is the merging of evaluation and empirical analysis, insofar as there are no consensual values, nor is it possible to distinguish them from decisions; that is, “one chooses values and policies at one and the same time.”³ The second is the inseparability of means and ends, both of which are also chosen simultaneously when values are irreconcilable. The third is that the only practicable test of a “good” policy is the political decision itself. The fourth is the reductionism of the analysis, which disregards important possible outcomes, potential proposals, and affected values. And finally, the last is that decisions result from successive limited comparisons, since policies are formulated and reformulated indefinitely, allowing for marginal adjustments to maintain the status quo.

Two decades later, Lindblom reaffirmed incrementalism as a pattern of policymaking, which “consists of policy change through small steps,” and refined the model. In addition to distinguishing the types of analysis within incrementalism, the author described decision-making in a pluralist structure of government as mutual adjustment among interests, that is, “a fragmented or highly decentralized policymaking process in which the various semi-autonomous participants mutually influence one another (as they always do).”⁴ Within this adjustment, four characteristics stand out: policies are described more as facts than as decisions; they are influenced by multiple participants and interests; the relationship between the policy itself and the reasons underlying it is obscure; and coordination reflects partisan mutual adjustment (rather than an effort at central coordination).

The conduct of defense policy in Brazil, in theory, follows an institutional logic. There are three conditioning documents—the National Defense Policy (PND), the National Defense Strategy (END), and the National Defense White Paper (LBDN)—which are subject to four-year cycles of review and updating and establish objectives, guidelines, and strategic actions to guide sectoral policies, strategies, and plans. The PND is the highest-level document and establishes the National Defense Objectives (ONDs), while the END defines the guidelines for achieving them; the LBDN, in turn, is an instrument of transparency regarding defense capabilities, intentions, and budget. In practice, the operational needs of the armed forces precede political and strategic direction. Thus, sectoral policies—including those concerning the defense industry and arms exports—run parallel to the conditioning policies, and the subsequent search for convergence is merely a rhetorical exercise.